I think that the “Total Generalship” collection over on A Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry by Bret Devereaux is a great resource for wargming and TTRPG rules on mass combat, and I would like to raid it for good ideas. First step; take notes.

Part I: Reports

“the information environment that an ancient or medieval general had access to: what could they know and how could they know it?”

“the attacking army’s goal was to ‘deliver a siege‘ to a key enemy population center as a way of gaining control over the surrounding territory”

Generals rely on “reports”. Reports may be from:

  • scouts (generaly fast cavalry)
  • civilians

Civilian rumors are less reliable but may cover a broader area. Scouts are more reliable but don’t stray far from body of army.

Reports are often wrong.

Reports are delivered at “man on horse” speed. 100 miles / day max with changing horses on preset routes. Walking speed for scouts and civilian rumors.

Often know:

  • what region enemy is in
  • where they are going / what goal is
  • often days/weeks old

True ambush battles are rare. Scout encounters can precipitate pitched battles however.

“frequently final preparations for a battle were made with both armies encamped fairly close to each other, often separated by just a few miles of open field.”

Options at this point:

  • assault an entrenched fortified camp
  • withdraw
  • starve
  • offer battle

Offerring battle lets the general choose time of day and ground.

Council of war happens night before or early morning between general and subordinates to set battle plan. This sets marching order out of camp, etc etc. Need time to plan this due to difficulties in organizing large bodies of men.

At this time, does not know if enemy will accept battle, what formation is, etc etc. Due to the time it takes to assume formation, can’t wait and see what enemy will do b/c you will be vulnerable.

Point is, have to make plans mostly blind.

Due to these constraints, generally ancient armies had standard formations. Heavy foot in center, lighter units on wings. Anchor flanks on favorable terrain features. Deploy light foot in rough terrain.

Battle size can be kilometers in width for 10,000 or so soldiers (Battle of Pydna). Manuever units are generally around 500 men or so (Roman cohort).

Approach marches and campsites are where commander has to make hard decisions.

Part II: Commands

What can the commander do with his limited information?

Two parts: command and leadership. Command: what to do. Leadership: inspiration, play the role the cultural expectations dictate.

Commanders have limited control.

Battles won by making soldiers run away. Soldiers can’t assess battle plans, only leaders against cultural expectations of good generals. Thus, generals are not free to command however they like. Must perform generalship.

Different sorts of generals

  1. Leader. Warrior-hero. Homer. Common in premodern era. Fight in front ranks.
  2. Commander. Stay clear of fighting. This is rare in premodern era. Coordinate reserves.
  3. Battle manager. In between the two. Pyrrhus, Alexander, Caesar. More below.

Commander model is rare in premodern because most engagements are shock engagements. Units in shock melee can’t be coordinated with. Generally committed until one side breaks.

How are commands given? Units flags held at front of unit. Soldiers go where the flag goes. Roman vexilla. Music - oman cornicen. Music can be used for a handful of simple prearranged signals. Again, musicians attached to that unit only.

How do commands get to musicians? Man-on-horse. Gallop at 40 km/hr - so several minutes to get to unit. Battle likely decided in an hour or two.

Reserves can be given new order far more easily than engaged units.

Battle manager

Delegated units to subordinates (taxiarch, tribune, etc).

Alexander rode with Companion cavalry. General course of battle by Alexander:

  1. Phalanxes press.
  2. Gaps created.
  3. Alexander sees gaps.
  4. Alexander leads Companion cavalry into gaps.

Caesar (and Roman generals more broadly). Sends reserves where needed (generally as manuever units of cohorts). Commits himself once all reserves committed. For visibility / inspiration, not leading shock attacks.

Towards a Model of Army Command

General decision points:

  1. Before the battle: formation, ground, timing.
  2. As army forms up: where general will be - in front or with reserves?
  3. As fight begins: where/when to commit reserves, where/when to commit himself.

Part IIIa: Discipline

Formations and why: battle line.

  1. Fighter only responsible for small frontage.
  2. Ranks add depth, secure fighters from being flanked, adds morale.

March in column, line up, face right/left, walk forwards –> this is not insurmountable from a coordination standpoint.

Cavalry can often get fancier. Aristocratic landowners trained for war from young age. More training = fancier manuevers.

Wheeling, etc, is hard. Achieved by drill / discipline (levy foot), or accultured synchonicity (steppe nomads). Drill appears in stratified agrarian societies.

Limits of the Possible with Synchonized Discipline

The Romans. Duh.

Manipular legion actions:

  1. Form up
  2. March forward
  3. Attack
  4. Retreat

Also have to coordinate between maniples.

Have a menu of actions to choose from. Just like limited decision points above - have limits orders that can be given.

Extra actions must be prepared and drilled ahead of time.

Takes decades to construct a “drill manual” of verbal knowledge. No printing press yet.

Example: volley fire was needed in 1500, finally deployed in 1600.

Continuous drilling required to keep soldiers effective. Means they must be kept under arms for training. Means large bureaucratic state. Prohibitively expensive for most states.

Part IIIb: Officers

Officers and a command system enable employment of that menu of tactical options generated by synchronized drill.

Militiaries reflect the societies they are formed by. For stratified agrarian societies, that is commonors and aristocrats. (NCOs vs comissioned officers).

For these purposes “officer” means anyone with command over other combatants (meaning both NCOs and commissioned officers).

Higher ratio of officers to soldiers means more capacity to perform complex manuevers. Except for the Romans. Because they expect officers to make more tactical decisions. “mission tactics” Auftragstaktik

Auftragstaktik “Mission tactics” = give junior officers a goal, not a plan.

To achieve this:

  • generals must be willing to allow officers to improvise
  • officers must feel empowered to improvise

“Thus the crucial question becomes: how far down the chain of command is independent action encouraged and how prepared are those officers to exercise that independence?”

Macedonians under Alexander? About 1,500 soldiers, or 1/6 of the army.

Romans under Caesar? About 100 soldiers (a century)

Part IIc: Morale and Cohesion

Morale = commitment to leadership and their cause

  1. their cause is a worthy one
  2. they are on the road to success
  3. the leaders have a good plan to get there

Cohesion = bonds between individual soldiers

  1. neighbors, friends, relatives
  2. shame
  3. drill

“morale gets men to the battle. cohesion gets men through it”

high morale & low cohesion = get to battle, fall apart, reform afterwards (First Battle of Bull Run).

low morale & high cohesion = refuse battle, but units stay together (1917 French Mutiny, Carthaginian mercenary rebellion, The Ten Thousand after Battle of Cunaxa).

Examples from videogames: Civil War Generals

  1. conduct all actions
  2. refuse to charge
  3. refuse to charge and refuse to shoot
  4. refuse to advance
  5. retreat in good order
  6. rout

On pre-modern battlefields, units frequently broke before receiving a charge (Battle of Mantinea).

Loss rates in Greek hoplite battles: 5% for winners, 15% for losers. Assume this is close to when armies break, because most battles are concluded with a rout rather than a massacre.

Loss rates in Roman battles: 5% for winners, 15% for losers. Very similar.

Rule of thumb: fall apart at 10% losses. Additional 5% losses incurred during rout.